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Ever since Koopmans (1947) criticized Burns and 
Mitchell's (1946) book on Measuring Business Cycles 
as being ''measurement without theory," the reporting 
of business cycle facts has been taboo in economics. In 
his essay, Koopmans presents two basic criticisms of 
Burns and Mitchell's study. The first is that it provides 
no systematic discussion of the theoretical reasons for 
including particular variables over others in their empir-
ical investigation. Before variables can be selected, 
Koopmans argues, some notion is needed of the theory 
that generates the economic fluctuations. With this first 
criticism we completely agree: Theory is crucial in 
selecting which facts to report. 
Koopmans' second criticism is that Burns and Mitch-
ell's study lacks explicit assumptions about the proba-
bility distribution of the variables. That is, their study 
lacks "assumptions expressing and specifying how 
random disturbances operate on the economy through 
the economic relationships between the variables" 
(Koopmans 1947, p. 172). What Koopmans has in 
mind as such relationships is clear when he concludes 
an overview of Burns and Mitchell's so-called measures 
with this sentence: "Not a single demand or supply 
schedule or other equation expressing the behavior of 
men [i.e., people] or the technical laws of production is 
employed explicitly in the book, and the cases of 
implicit use are few and far between" (p. 163). Koop-
mans repeatedly stresses this need for using a structural 
system of equations as an organizing principle (pp. 
169-70). Economists, he argues, should first hypothe-
size that the aggregate time series under consideration 
are generated by some probability model, which the 
economists must then estimate and test. Koopmans 
convinced the economics profession that to do other-
wise is unscientific. On this point we strongly disagree 
with Koopmans: We think he did economics a grave 
disservice, because the reporting of facts—without 
assuming the data are generated by some probability 
model—is an important scientific activity. We see no 
reason for economics to be an exception. 
As a spectacular example of facts influencing the 
development of economic theory, we refer to the 
growth facts that came out of the empirical work of 
Kuznets and others. According to Solow (1970, p. 2), 
these facts were instrumental in the development of his 
own neoclassical growth model, which has since be-
come the most important organizing structure in macro-
economics, whether the issue is one of growth or 
fluctuations or public finance. Loosely paraphrased, the 
key growth facts that Solow lists (on pp. 2-3) are 
• Real output per worker (or per worker-hour) grows 
at a roughly constant rate over extended time 
periods. 
• The stock of real capital, crudely measured, grows 
at a roughly constant rate which exceeds the 
growth rate of labor input. 
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3 • The growth rates of real output and the stock of 
capital goods tend to be similar, so the capital-to-
output ratio shows no systematic trend. 
• The rate of profit on capital has a horizontal trend. 
These facts are neither estimates nor measures of 
anything; they are obtained without first hypothesizing 
that the time series are generated by a probability 
model belonging to some class. From this example, no 
one can deny that the reporting of growth facts has 
scientific value: Why else would Kuznets have received 
a Nobel Prize for this work? Or Solow, as well, for 
developing a parsimonious theory that rationalizes 
these facts—namely, his neoclassical growth model? 
The growth facts are not the only interesting features 
of these aggregate time series. Also of interest are the 
more volatile changes that occur in these and other 
aggregates—that is, the cyclical behavior of the time 
series. These observations are interesting because they 
apparently conflict with basic competitive theory, in 
which outcomes reflect people's ability and willingness 
to substitute between consumption and leisure at a 
given point in time and between consumption at dif-
ferent points in time. 
The purpose of this article is to present the business 
cycle facts in light of established neoclassical growth 
theory, which we use as the organizing framework for 
our presentation of business cycle facts. We emphasize 
that the statistics reported here are not measures of 
anything; rather, they are statistics that display interest-
ing patterns, given the established neoclassical growth 
theory. In discussions of business cycle models, a 
natural question is, Do the corresponding statistics for 
the model economy display these patterns? We find 
these features interesting because the patterns they 
seem to display are inconsistent with the theory. 
The study of business cycles flourished from the 
1920s through the 1940s. But in the 1950s and 1960s, 
with the development of the structural system-of-
equations approach that Koopmans advocated, busi-
ness cycles ceased to be an active area of economic 
research. Now, once again, the study of business cycles, 
in the form of recurrent fluctuations, is alive. At the 
leading research centers, economists are again con-
cerned with the question of why, in market economies, 
aggregate output and employment undergo repeated 
fluctuations about trend.
1 
Instrumental in bringing business cycles back into 
the mainstream of economic research is the important 
paper by Lucas (1977), "Understanding Business Cy-
cles." We follow Lucas in defining business cycles as the 
deviations of aggregate real output from trend. We 
complete his definition by providing an explicit pro-
cedure for calculating a time series trend that success-
fully mimics the smooth curves most business cycle 
researchers would draw through plots of the data. We 
also follow Lucas in viewing the business cycle facts as 
the statistical properties of the comovements of devia-
tions from trend of various economic aggregates with 
those of real output. 
Lucas' definition differs importantly from that of 
Mitchell (1913, 1927), whose definition had guided 
students of business cycles up until World War II. 
Mitchell represents business cycles as sequences of ex-
pansions and contractions, particularly emphasizing 
turning points and phases of the cycle. We think the 
developments in economic theory that followed Mitch-
ell's work dictate Lucas' representation of cycles. 
Equipped with our operational definition of cyclical 
deviations, we present what we see as the key business 
cycle facts for the United States economy in the post-
Korean War period (1954-1989). Some of these facts 
are fairly well known; others, however, are likely to 
come as a surprise because they are counter to beliefs 
often stated in the literature. 
An important example of one of these commonly 
held beliefs is that the price level always has been 
procyclical and that, in this regard, the postwar period is 
no exception. Even Lucas (1977, p. 9) lists procyclical 
price levels among business cycle regularities. This 
perceived fact strongly influenced business cycle re-
search in the 1970s. A more recent example of this 
misbelief is when Bernanke (1986, p. 76) discusses a 
study by King and Plosser (1984): "Although some 
points of their analysis could be criticized (for example, 
there is no tight explanation of the relation between 
transaction services and the level of demand deposits, 
and the model does not yield a strong prediction of price 
procyclicality), the overall framework is not implau-
sible." Even more recently, Mankiw (1989, p. 88), in 
discussing the same paper, points out that "while the 
story of King and Plosser can explain the procyclical 
behavior of money, it cannot explain the procyclical 
behavior of prices." We shall see that, in fact, these 
criticisms are based on what is a myth. We show that 
during the 35 years since the Korean War, the price 
level has displayed a clear countercyclical pattern. 
Other misperceptions we expose are the beliefs that 
1 The view of Hayek (1933, p. 33) in the 1930s and Lucas (1977, p. 7) in the 
1970s is that answering this question is one of the outstanding challenges to 
economic research. 
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the real wage is either countercyclical or essentially 
uncorrelated with the cycle and that the money stock, 
whether measured by the monetary base or by Ml, 
leads the cycle. 
The real facts documented in this paper are that 
major output components tend to move together over 
the cycle, with investment in consumer and producer 
durables having several times larger percentage devia-
tions than does spending on nondurable consumption. 
Alternative Views of Business Cycles 
To many, when we talk about cycles, the picture that 
comes to mind is a sine wave with its regular and re-
current pattern. In economics and other sciences, how-
ever, the term cycle refers to a more general concept. 
One of the best-known examples of cycles is the sun-
spot cycle, which varies in length from under 10 years 
to nearly 20 years. The significant fact about cycles is 
the recurrent nature of the events. 
In 1922, at a Conference on Cycles, representatives 
from several sciences discussed the cyclical phenomena 
in their fields. The participants agreed on the following 
definition (quoted in Mitchell 1927, p. 377) as being 
reasonable for all the sciences: "In general scientific use 
... the word (cycle) denotes a recurrence of different 
phases of plus and minus departures, which are often 
susceptible of exact measurement." Our definition of 
business cycles is consistent with this general definition, 
but we refer to departures as deviations. 
Mitchell's Four Phases 
In 1913, Wesley C. Mitchell published a major work on 
business cycles, in it reviewing the research that had 
preceded his own. The book presents his largely 
descriptive approach, which consists of decomposing a 
large number of time series into sequences of cycles and 
then dividing each cycle into four distinct phases. This 
work was continued by Mitchell (1927) and by Burns 
and Mitchell (1946), who defined business cycles as 
... a type of fluctuation found in the aggregate economic 
activity of nations that organize their work mainly in 
business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions occur-
ring at about the same time in many economic activities, 
followed by similarly general recessions, contractions, and 
revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next 
cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent but not 
periodic; in duration business cycles vary from more than 
one year to ten or twelve years; they are not divisible into 
shorter cycles of similar character with amplitudes approx-
imating their own (p. 3). 
From the discussion in their books, it is clear the authors 
view business cycles as consisting of four phases that 
inevitably evolve from one into another: prosperity, 
crisis, depression, and revival. This view is expressed 
perhaps most clearly by Mitchell ([1923] 1951, p. 46), 
who writes: "Then in order will come a discussion of 
how prosperity produces conditions which lead to 
crises, how crises run into depressions, and finally how 
depressions after a time produce conditions which lead 
to new revivals." Mitchell clearly had in mind a 
theoretical framework consistent with that view. In 
defending the use of the framework of four distinct 
cyclical phases, Mitchell later wrote that "most current 
theories explain crises by what happens in prosperity 
and revivals by what happens in depression" (Mitchell 
1927, p. 472). (For an extensive overview of these 
theories and their relationship to Mitchell's descriptive 
work, see Haberler 1937.) 
We now know how to construct model economies 
whose equilibria display business cycles like those 
envisioned by Mitchell. For example, a line of research 
that gained attention in the 1980s demonstrates that 
cyclical patterns of this form result as equilibrium 
behavior for economic environments with appropriate 
preferences and technologies. (See, for example, Ben-
habib and Nishimura 1985 and Boldrin 1989.) Burns 
and Mitchell would have been much more influential if 
business cycle theory had evolved in this way. Koop-
mans (1957, pp. 215-16) makes this point in his largely 
unnoticed "second thought" on Burns and Mitchell's 
work on business cycles. 
In retrospect, it is now clear that the field of business 
cycles has moved in a completely different direction 
from the one Mitchell envisioned. Theories with deter-
ministic cyclical laws of motion may a priori have had 
considerable potential for accounting for business 
cycles; but in fact, they have failed to do so. They have 
failed because cyclical laws of motion do not arise as 
equilibrium behavior for economies with empirically 
reasonable preferences and technologies—that is, for 
economies with reasonable statements of people's 
ability and willingness to substitute. 
Frisch's Pendulum 
As early as the 1930s, some economists were develop-
ing business cycle models that gave rise to difference 
equations with random shocks. An important example 
appears in a paper by Ragnar Frisch ([1933] 1965). 
Frisch was careful to distinguish between impulses in 
the form of random shocks, on the one hand, and their 
propagation over time, on the other. In contrast with 
proponents of modern business cycle theory, he empha-
sized damped oscillatory behavior. The concept of 
5 equilibrium was interpreted as a system at rest (as it is, 
for instance, in the science of mechanics). 
The analogy of a pendulum is sometimes used to 
describe this view of cycles. Shocks are needed to 
provide "energy in maintaining oscillations" in damped 
cyclical systems. Frisch reports that he was influenced 
by Knut Wicksell, to whom he attributes the following: 
"If you hit a wooden rocking horse with a club, the 
movement of the horse will be very different to that of 
the club" (quoted in Frisch [1933] 1965, p. 178). The 
use of the rocking horse and pendulum analogies under-
scores their emphasis on cycles in the form of damped 
oscillations. 
The research of Frisch and Wicksell received con-
siderable attention in the 1930s, but no one built on 
their work. Construction stopped primarily because the 
neoclassical growth model and the necessary concep-
tual tools (particularly the Arrow-Debreu general equi-
librium theory) had not yet been developed. Since the 
tools to do quantitative dynamic general equilibrium 
analysis weren't available, whereas statistical time 
series techniques were advancing rapidly, it's not 
surprising that quantitative system-of-equation mod-
els—especially the Keynesian income-expenditure 
models—received virtually all the attention. 
Slutzky's Random Shocks 
An entirely different way of generating cycles is sug-
gested by the statistical work of Eugen Slutzky (1937). 
Slutzky shows that cycles resembling business fluctua-
tions can be generated as the sum of random causes— 
that is, by a stable, low-order, stochastic difference 
equation with large positive real roots. 
The following exercise illustrates how Slutzky's 
method can generate cycles. Let the random variable et 
take the value 0.5 if a coin flip shows heads and —0.5 if 
tails. Assume that 
(1) yt+\ = 0.95yt + et+\. 
By repeated substitutionals related to current and past 
shocks in the following way: 
(2) yt = et + 0.95et-{ + 0.95 V2 +'' ' 
+ 0.95'-^ + 0.95%. 
The yt are geometrically declining sums of past shocks. 
Given an initial value y0 and a fair coin, this stochastic 
difference equation can be used to generate a random 
path for the variable y. 
Chart 1 
Cycles Generated by Slutzky's Mechanism 
yt 
Chart 1 plots a time series generated in this way. The 
time series displays patterns that Burns and Mitchell 
(1946) would characterize as business cycles.
2 The 
amplitudes and duration of cycles are variable, with the 
duration varying from 1 to 12 years and averaging 
about 3 V2 years. The time series seems to display cycles 
in Mitchell's sense of expansions containing the seed for 
recessions and vice versa. But, by construction, reces-
sions do not contain the seed of subsequent expansions. 
At each point in time, the expected future path is mono-
tonic and converges to the zero mean, with 5 percent of 
the distance being closed in each quarterly time period. 
Another demonstration of the role that random 
shocks can play appears in a paper by Adelman and 
Adelman (1959). Using the Klein-Goldberger model, 
they show that by adding random shocks to the model, 
it produces aggregate time series that look remarka-
bly like those of the post-World War II economy of the 
United States. The deterministic version of this model 
converges almost monotonically to a point. This exer-
cise forcefully demonstrates that a stochastic process 
can generate recurrent cycles while its deterministic 
version can converge monotonically. 
Advancing to Lucas' Deviations 
In the 1940s and the 1950s, while macroeconometric 
2King and Plosser (1989) describe a well-defined, judgment-free scheme 
that successfully mimics the Burns and Mitchell procedure. The description of 
the cycles in the time series plotted in Chart 1 is based on this procedure. 
6 Finn E. Kydland, Edward C. Prescott 
Business Cycles 
system-of-equations models were being developed, 
important theoretical advances were being made along 
entirely different fronts. By the early 1960s, economists' 
understanding of the way economic environments work 
in general equilibrium had advanced by leaps and 
bounds. The application of general equilibrium theory 
in dynamic environments led to theoretical insights on 
the growth of economies; it also led to important 
measurements of the parameters of the aggregate 
production function that formed the foundation for 
neoclassical growth theory. Thus, by the late 1960s, 
there were two established theories competing for domi-
nance in aggregate economics. One was the behavioral-
empirical approach reflected in the Keynesian system-
of-equations models. The other was the neoclassical 
approach, which modeled environments with rational, 
maximizing individuals and firms. The neoclassical 
approach dominated public finance, growth theory, and 
international trade. As neoclassical theory progressed, 
an unresolvable conflict developed between the two 
approaches. The impasse developed because dynamic 
maximizing behavior is inconsistent with the assump-
tion of invariant behavioral equations, an assumption 
that underlies the system-of-equations approach. 
Not until the 1970s did business cycles again receive 
attention, spurred on by Lucas' (1977) article, "Un-
derstanding Business Cycles." There, Lucas viewed 
business cycle regularities as "comovements of the 
deviations from trend in different aggregative time 
series." He defined the business cycle itself as the 
"movements about trend in gross national product." 
Two types of considerations led Lucas to this definition: 
the previously discussed findings of Slutzky and the 
Adelmans, and the important advances in economic 
theory, especially neoclassical growth theory. We in-
terpret Lucas as viewing business cycle fluctuations as 
being of interest because they are at variance with 
established neoclassical growth theory. 
Another important theoretical advance of the 1960s 
and 1970s was the development of recursive competi-
tive equilibrium theory. This theory made it possible to 
study abstractions of the aggregate economy in which 
optimizing economic behavior produces behavioral 
relations in the form of low-order stochastic difference 
equations. The role these advances played for Lucas' 
thinking is clear, as evident from one of his later articles 
discussing methods and problems in business cycle 
theory (see Lucas 1980). 
In contrast with Mitchell's view of business cycles, 
Lucas does not think in terms of sequences of cycles as 
inevitable waves in economic activity, nor does he see a 
need to distinguish among different phases of the cycle. 
To Lucas, the comovements over time of the cyclical 
components of economic aggregates are of primary 
interest, and he gives several examples of what he views 
as the business cycle regularities. We make explicit and 
operational what we mean by these terms and present a 
systematic account of the regularities. When that step is 
implemented quantitatively, some regularities emerge 
that, in the 1970s, would have come as a surprise—even 
to Lucas. 
Modern Business Cycle Theory 
In the 1980s and now in the early 1990s, business cycles 
(in the sense of recurrent fluctuations) increasingly 
have become a focus of study in aggregate economics. 
Such studies are generally guided by perceived business 
cycle regularities. But if these perceptions are not in fact 
the regularities, then certain lines of research are 
misguided. 
For example, the myth that the price level is pro-
cyclical largely accounts for the prevalence in the 
1970s of studies that use equilibrium models with mon-
etary policy or price surprises as the main source of 
fluctuations. At the time, monetary disturbances ap-
peared to be the only plausible source of fluctuations 
that could not be ruled out as being too small, so they 
were the leading candidate. The work of Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) also contributed to the view that mone-
tary disturbances are the main source of business cycle 
fluctuations. Their work marshaled extensive empirical 
evidence to support the position that monetary policy is 
an important factor in determining aggregate output, 
employment, and other key aggregates. 
Since the early studies of Burns and Mitchell, the 
emphasis in business cycle theory has shifted from 
essentially pure theoretical work to quantitative theo-
retical analysis. This quantitative research has had 
difficulty finding an important role for monetary 
changes as a source of fluctuations in real aggregates. 
As a result, attention has shifted to the role of other 
factors—technological changes, tax changes, and terms-
of-trade shocks. This research has been strongly guided 
by business cycle facts and regularities such as those to 
be presented here. 
Along with the shift in focus to investigating the 
sources and nature of business cycles, aggregate analy-
sis underwent a methodological revolution. Previously, 
empirical knowledge had been organized in the form of 
equations, as was also the case for the early rational 
expectations models. Muth (1960), in his pioneering 
work on rational expectations, did not break with this 
7 system-of-equations tradition. For that reason, his 
econometric program did not come to dominate. In-
stead, the program which has prevailed is the one that 
organizes empirical knowledge around preferences, 
technology, information structure, and policy rules or 
arrangements. Sargent (1981) has led the development 
of tools for inferring values of parameters character-
izing these elements, given the behavior of the ag-
gregate time series. As a result, aggregate economics is 
no longer a separate and entirely different field from the 
rest of economics; it now uses the same tools and 
empirical knowledge as other branches of economics, 
such as finance, growth theory, public finance, and 
international economics. With this development, mea-
surements and quantitative findings in those other fields 
can be used to restrict models of business cycles and 
make our knowledge about the quantitative importance 
of cyclical disturbances more precise. 
Business Cycle Deviations Redefined 
Because economic activity in industrial market econo-
mies is characterized by sustained growth, Lucas 
defines business cycles as deviations of real gross 
national product (GNP) from trend rather than from 
some constant or average value. But Lucas does not 
define trend, so his definition of business cycle devia-
tions is incomplete. What guides our, and we think his, 
concept of trend is steady state growth theory. With this 
theory there is exogenous labor-augmenting technolog-
ical change that occurs at a constant rate; that is, the 
effectiveness of labor grows at some constant rate. 
Steady state growth is characterized by per capita 
output, consumption, investment, capital stock, and the 
real wage all growing at the same rate as does tech-
nology. The part of productive time allocated to market 
activity and the real return on capital remain constant. 
If the rate of technological change were constant, 
then the trend of the logarithm of real GNP would be a 
linear function of time. But the rate of technological 
change varies both over time and across countries. 
(Why it varies is the central problem in economic 
development or maybe in all of economics.) The rate of 
change clearly is related to the arrangements and 
institutions that a society uses and, more important, to 
the arrangements and institutions that people expect 
will be used in the future. Even in a relatively stable 
society like the United States since the Second World 
War, there have been significant changes in institutions. 
And when a society's institutions change, there are 
changes in the productivity growth of that society's 
labor and capital. In the United States, the rate of 
technological change in the 1950s and 1960s was 
significantly above the U.S. historical average rate over 
the past 100 years. In the 1970s, the rate was signifi-
cantly below average. In the 1980s, the rate was near 
the historical average. Because the underlying rate of 
technological change has not been constant in the 
period we examine (1954-1989), detrending using a 
linear function of time is inappropriate. The scheme 
used must let the average rate of technological change 
vary over time, but not too rapidly. 
Any definition of the trend and cycle components, 
and for that matter the seasonal component, is neces-
sarily statistical. A decomposition is a representation of 
the data. A representation is useful if, in light of theory, 
it reveals some interesting patterns in the data. We think 
our representation is successful in this regard. Our selec-
tion of a trend definition was guided by the following 
criteria: 
• The trend component for real GNP should be ap-
proximately the curve that students of business 
cycles and growth would draw through a time plot 
of this time series. 
• The trend of a given time series should be a linear 
transformation of that time series, and this transfor-
mation should be the same for all series.
3 
• Lengthening the sample period should not signifi-
cantly alter the value of the deviations at a given 
date, except possibly near the end of the original 
sample. 
• The scheme should be well defined, judgment free, 
and cheaply reproducible. 
These criteria led us to the following scheme. Let yt, 
for t = 1,2,... ,T, denote a time series. We deal with 
logarithms of a variable, unless the variable is a share, 
because the percentage deviations are what display the 
interesting patterns. Moreover, when an exponentially 
growing time series is so transformed, it becomes linear 
in time. Our trend component, denoted rr, for t= 1,2,..., 





3The reason for linearity is that the first two moments of the transformed 
data are functions of the first two moments, and not the higher moments, of the 
original data. The principal rationale for the same transformation being applied 
to all time series is that it makes little sense to carry out the analogue of growth 
accounting with the inputs to the production function subject to one transfor-
mation and the outputs subject to another. 
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for an appropriately chosen positive A. (The value of A 
will be specified momentarily.) The first term is the sum 
of the squared deviations dt — yt— rt. The second term is 
multiple k of the sum of the squares of the trend com-
ponent's second differences. This second term penalizes 
variations in the growth rate of the trend component, 
with the penalty being correspondingly larger if A is 
larger. 
The first-order conditions for this convex minimiza-
tion problem are linear and can be solved for the r,.
4 
We found that if the time series are quarterly, a value of 
A = 1600 is reasonable. With this value, the implied 
trend path for the logarithm of real GNP is close to the 
one that students of business cycles and growth would 
draw through a time plot of this series, as shown in 
Chart 2. The remaining criteria guiding our selection of 
a detrending procedure are satisfied as well. 
We have learned that this procedure for constructing 
a smooth curve through the data has a long history in 
both the actuarial and the natural sciences. Stigler 
(1978) reports that actuarial scientists used this method 
in the 1920s. He also notes that John von Neumann, 
who undoubtedly reinvented it, used it in the ballistics 
literature in the early 1940s. That others facing similar 
problems developed this simple scheme attests to its 
reasonableness. What is surprising is that economists 
took so long to exploit this scheme and that so many of 
them were so hostile to the idea when it was finally 
introduced into economics.
5 
Business Cycle Facts and Regularities 
We emphasize that our selection of the facts to report is 
guided by neoclassical growth theory. This theory, 
currently the established one in aggregate economics, is 
being used not only to study growth and development 
but also to address public finance issues and, more 
recently, to study business cycles. The facts we present 
here are the values of well-defined statistics for the U.S. 
economy since the Korean War (1954-1989). We refer 
to consistent patterns in these numbers as business cycle 
regularities. 
The statistics presented in Tables 1-4 provide 
information on three basic aspects of the cyclical 
behavior of aggregates: 
• The amplitude of fluctuations 
• The degree of comovement with real GNP 
(our measure of pro- or countercyclicality) 
• The phase shift of a variable relative to the overall 
business cycle, as defined by the behavior of cycli-
cal real GNP. 
Chart 2 
Actual and Trend of U.S. Real Gross National Product 
Quarterly, 1954-1989 
Tril. of 1982 $ 
Source of basic data: Citicorp's Citibase data bank 
We emphasize that, except for the share variables 
shown in Table 2, these statistics are percentage, not 
absolute, deviations. For instance, the percentage devi-
ation of investment expenditures is more than three 
times that of total real GNP. Since this component 
averages less than one-fifth of real GNP, its absolute 
volatility is somewhat less than that of total output. 
In the tables, the degree of contemporaneous co-
movement with real GNP is indicated in the x(t) col-
umn. The statistics in that column are the correlation 
coefficients of the cyclical deviations of each series 
with the cyclical deviations of real GNP. A number 
close to one indicates that a series is highly procyclical; 
a number close to one but of the opposite sign indicates 
that a series is countercyclical. A number close to zero 
means that a series does not vary contemporaneously 
with the cycle in any systematic way, in which case we 
say the series is uncorrected with the cycle. 
The remaining columns of the tables also display 
4A short FORTRAN subroutine that efficiently computes the trend and 
deviations components is available on request to the Research Department, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The computation time required by this 
algorithm increases linearly with the length of the sample period, as do storage 
requirements. 
5 This approach was introduced in an unpublished paper by Hodrick and 
Prescott (1980). 
9 correlation coefficients, except the series have been 
shifted forward or backward, relative to real GNP, by 
from one to five quarters. To some extent these 
numbers indicate the degree of comovement with GNP. 
Their main purpose, however, is to indicate whether, 
typically, there is a phase shift in the movement of a 
time series relative to real GNP. For example, if for 
some series the numbers in the middle of each table are 
positive but largest in column x(t~i), where i > 0, then 
the numbers indicate that the series is procyclical but 
tends to peak about i quarters before real GNP. In this 
case we say the series leads the cycle. Correspondingly, 
a series that lags the cycle byj > 0 quarters would have 
the largest correlation coefficient in the column headed 
by x(t+j). For example, productivity is a series that 
leads the cycle, whereas the stock of inventories is one 
that lags the cycle. 
We let the neoclassical growth model dictate which 
facts to examine and how to organize them. The 
aggregate economy can be divided broadly into three 
sectors: businesses, households, and government. In 
the business sector, the model emphasizes production 
inputs as well as output components. Households allo-
cate income earned in the business sector to consump-
tion and saving. In the aggregate, there is an accounting 
relation between household saving and business invest-
ment. Households allocate a fraction of their discre-
tionary time to income-earning activities in the business 
sector. The remaining fraction goes to nonmarket 
activities, usually referred to as leisure but sometimes 
(perhaps more appropriately) as input to household 
production. This time-allocation decision has received 
little attention in growth theory, but it is crucial to 
business cycle theory. The government sector, which is 
at the heart of public finance theory, also could play a 
significant role for business cycles. 
Table 1 
Cyclical Behavior of U.S. Production Inputs 
Deviations From Trend of Input Variables 
Quarterly, 1954-1989 
Cross Correlation of Real GNP With 
Variable x 
vuidumy 
(% Std. Dev.)  x(t- 5)  x(t-A)  x(t- 3)  x(t- 2)  x(M)  x(t)  x(/+1)  x(t+ 2)  x(t+3)  x(t+4)  x(t+5) 
Real Gross National Product  1.71  -0.03  0.15  0.38  0.63  0.85  1.00  0.85  0.63  0.38  0.15  -0.03 
Labor Input 
Hours (Household Survey)  1.47  -0.10  0.05  0.23  0.44  0.69  0.86  0.86  0.75  0.59  0.38  0.18 
Employment  1.06  -0.18  -0.04  0.14  0.36  0.61  0.82  0.89  0.82  0.67  0.47  0.25 
Hours per Worker  0.54  0.08  0.21  0.35  0.49  0.66  0.71  0.59  0.43  0.29  0.11  -0.02 
Hours (Establishment Survey)  1.65  -0.23  -0.07  0.14  0.39  0.66  0.88  0.92  0.81  0.64  0.42  0.21 
GNP/Hours (Household Survey)  0.88  0.11  0.21  0.34  0.48  0.50  0.51  0.21  -0.02  -0.25  -0.34  -0.36 
GNP/Hours (Establishment Survey)  0.83  0.40  0.46  0.49  0.53  0.43  0.31  -0.07  -0.31  -0.49  -0.52  -0.50 
Average Hourly Real Compensation  0.91  0.30  0.37  0.40  0.42  0.40  0.35  0.26  0.17  0.05  -0.08  -0.20 
(Business Sector) 
Capital Input 
Nonresidental Capital Stock*  0.62  -0.58  -0.61  -0.51  -0.48  -0.31  -0.08  0.16  0.39  0.56  0.66  0.70 
Structures  0.37  -0.45  -0.51  -0.55  -0.53  -0.44  -0.29  -0.10  0.09  0.25  0.38  0.45 
Producers' Durable Equipment  0.99  -0.57  -0.58  -0.53  -0.41  -0.22  0.02  0.26  0.47  0.62  0.70  0.71 
Inventory Stock (Nonfarm)  1.65  -0.37  -0.33  -0.23  -0.05  0.19  0.50  0.72  0.83  0.81  0.71  0.53 
"Based on quarterly data, 1954:1-1984:2. 
Source of basic data: Citicorp's Citibase data bank 
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The standard version of the neoclassical growth 
model abstracts from money and therefore provides 
little guidance about which of the nominal variables to 
examine. Given the prominence that monetary shocks 
have held for many years as the main candidate for the 
impulse to business cycles, it seems appropriate that we 
also examine the cyclical behavior of monetary aggre-
gates and nominal prices. 
Real Facts 
• Production Inputs 
We first examine real (nonmonetary) series related to 
the inputs in aggregate production. The cyclical facts 
Table 2 
Cyclical Behavior of U.S. Output and Income Components 
Deviations From Trend of Product and Income Variables 
Quarterly, 1954-1989 
Cross Correlation of Real GNP With 
Variable/ 
Volatility 
(% Std. Dev.)  x(t- 5)  x(M)  x(t-3)  x(t- 2)  x(M)  x(t)  x(t+1)  x(t+2)  x(t+3)  x(/+4)  x(t+5) 
Real Gross National Product  1.71  -0.03  0.15  0.38  0.63  0.85  1.00  0.85  0.63  0.38  0.15  -0.03 
Consumption Expenditures  1.25  0.25  0.41  0.56  0.71  0.81  0.82  0.66  0.45  0.21  -0.02  -0.21 
Nondurables & Services  0.84  0.20  0.38  0.53  0.67  0.77  0.76  0.63  0.46  0.27  0.06  -0.12 
Nondurables  1.23  0.29  0.42  0.52  0.62  0.69  0.69  0.57  0.38  0.16  -0.05  -0.22 
Services  0.63  0.03  0.25  0.46  0.63  0.73  0.71  0.60  0.49  0.39  0.23  0.07 
Durables  4.99  0.25  0.38  0.50  0.64  0.74  0.77  0.60  0.37  0.10  -0.14  -0.32 
Investment Expenditures  8.30  0.04  0.19  0.39  0.60  0.79  0.91  0.75  0.50  0.21  -0.05  -0.26 
Fixed Investment  5.38  0.09  0.25  0.44  0.64  0.83  0.90  0.81  0.60  0.35  0.08  -0.14 
Nonresidential  5.18  -0.26  -0.13  0.05  0.31  0.57  0.80  0.88  0.83  0.68  0.46  0.23 
Structures  4.75  -0.40  -0.31  -0.17  0.03  0.29  0.52  0.65  0.69  0.63  0.50  0.34 
Equipment  6.21  -0.18  -0.04  0.14  0.39  0.65  0.85  0.90  0.81  0.62  0.38  0.15 
Residential  10.89  0.42  0.56  0.66  0.73  0.73  0.62  0.37  0.10  -0.15  -0.34  -0.45 
Government Purchases  2.07  0.00  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  0.05  0.09  0.12  0.17  0.27  0.34 
Federal  3.68  0.00  -0.05  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09  -0.02  0.03  0.06  0.10  0.19  0.24 
State & Local  1.19  0.06  0.10  0.17  0.25  0.26  0.25  0.20  0.16  0.19  0.27  0.36 
Exports  5.53  -0.50  -0.46  -0.34  -0.14  0.11  0.34  0.48  0.53  0.53  0.53  0.45 
Imports  4.92  0.11  0.18  0.30  0.45  0.61  0.71  0.71  0.51  0.28  0.03  -0.19 
Real Net National Income 
Labor Income*  1.58  -0.18  -0.02  0.18  0.42  0.68  0.88  0.90  0.80  0.62  0.40  0.19 
Capital Income**  2.93  0.10  0.24  0.44  0.63  0.79  0.84  0.60  0.30  0.02  -0.19  -0.29 
Proprietors' Income & Misc.f  2.70  0.11  0.24  0.38  0.55  0.62  0.68  0.46  0.29  0.11  0.02  -0.10 
* Employee compensation is deflated by the implicit GNP price deflator. 
**This variable includes corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, plus rental income of persons with capital consumption adjustment, 
plus net interest, plus capital consumption allowances with capital consumption adjustment, all deflated by the implicit GNP price deflator. 
fProprietors' income with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, plus indirect business tax and nontax liability, plus business transfer payments, plus 
current surplus of government enterprises, less subsidies, plus statistical discrepancy. 
Source of basic data: Citicorp's Citibase data bank 
11 are summarized in Table 1. Since it is not unreasonable 
to think of the inventory stock as providing productive 
services, we include this series with the labor and 
capital inputs. 
The two most common measures of the labor input 
are aggregate hours-worked according to the house-
hold survey and, alternatively, the payroll or establish-
ment survey. We see in Table 1 that total hours with 
either measure is strongly procyclical and has cyclical 
variation which, in percentage terms, is almost as large 
as that of real GNP. (For a visual representation of this 
behavior, see Chart 3.) The capital stock, in contrast, 
varies smoothly over the cycle and is essentially 
uncorrelated with contemporaneous real GNP. The 
correlation is large, however, if the capital stock is 
shifted back by about a year. In other words, business 
capital lags the cycle by at least a year. The inventory 
stock also lags the cycle, but only by about half a year. 
In percentage terms, the inventory stock is nearly as 
volatile as quarterly real GNP. 
The hours-worked series from the household survey 
can be decomposed into employment fluctuations on 
the one hand and variations in hours per worker on the 
other. Employment lags the cycle, while hours per 
worker is nearly contemporaneous with it, with only a 
slight lead. Much more of the volatility in total hours 
worked is caused by employment volatility than by 
changes in hours per worker. If these two subseries were 
perfectly correlated, their standard deviations would 
add up to the standard deviation of total hours. 
Although not perfectly correlated, their correlation is 
quite high, at 0.86. Therefore, employment accounts 
for roughly two-thirds of the standard deviation in 
total hours while hours per worker accounts for about 
one-third. 
As a measure of the aggregate labor input, aggregate 
hours has a problem: it does not account for differences 
across workers in their relative contributions to aggre-
gate output. That is, the hours of a brain surgeon are 
given the same weight as those of an orderly. This 
Table 3 
Cyclical Behavior of U.S. Output and Income Component Shares 
Deviations From Trend of Product and Income Variables 
Quarterly, 1954-1989 
Mean Cross Correlation of Real GNP With 
% of Volatility 
Variablex GNP (% std. Dev.) x(/-5) x{t-4) x{t-3) x(t-2) x(M) x(t) x(M) x{t+2) x(t+3) x(t+4) x(t+5) 
Gross National Product 
Consumption Expenditures  63.55  0.58  0.29  0.15  -0.06  -0.32  -0.56  -0.78  -0.68  -0.52  -0.33  -0.17  -0.03 
Nondurables & Services  54.79  0.70  0.06  -0.08  -0.27  -0.51  -0.72  -0.89  -0.73  -0.50  -0.23  0.01  0.18 
Durables  8.76  0.33  0.36  0.43  0.48  0.54  0.56  0.53  0.36  0.15  -0.10  -0.31  -0.44 
Investment Expenditures  15.85  1.07  0.03  0.18  0.36  0.56  0.75  0.87  0.71  0.47  0.18  -0.09  -0.30 
Fixed Investment  15.16  0.56  0.11  0.25  0.40  0.57  0.74  0.81  0.77  0.61  0.40  0.14  -0.08 
Change in Business Inventories  0.69  0.69  0.04  0.07  0.24  0.40  0.56  0.69  0.48  0.22  -0.05  -0.25  -0.40 
Government Purchases  20.13  0.57  0.04  -0.09  -0.25  -0.40  -0.55  -0.61  -0.52  -0.36  -0.15  0.09  0.28 
Net Exports  0.47  0.45  -0.51  -0.51  -0.48  -0.43  -0.37  -0.28  -0.17  0.00  0.17  0.30  0.38 
: National Income* 
Labor Income  58.57  0.47  -0.29  -0.36  -0.45  -0.52  -0.47  -0.39  -0.03  0.23  0.42  0.48  0.46 
Capital Income  24.38  0.42  0.19  0.25  0.36  0.43  0.48  0.43  0.17  -0.13  -0.35  -0.48  -0.46 
Proprietors' Income & Misc.  17.04  0.34  0.18  0.19  0.17  0.17  0.06  0.00  -0.16  -0.19  -0.20  -0.11  -0.11 
*For explanations of the national income components, see notes to Table 2. 
Source of basic data: Citicorp's Citibase data bank 
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Chart 3 
Deviations From Trend of U.S. Real Gross National Product 
and Hours Worked* 
Quarterly, 1954-1989 
*The estimate of hours worked uses the establishment survey. 
Source of basic data: Citicorp's Citibase data bank 
disparity would not be problematic if the cyclical 
volatility of highly skilled workers resembled that of the 
workers who are less skilled. But it doesn't. The hours of 
the less-skilled group are much more variable, as 
established in one of our recent studies (Kydland and 
Prescott 1989). Using data for nearly 5,000 people 
from all major demographic groups over the period 
1969-82, we found that, cyclically, aggregate hours is 
a poor measure of the labor input. When people were 
weighted by their relative human capital, the labor 
input for this sample and period varied only about 
two-thirds as much as did aggregate hours. We there-
fore recommend that the cyclical behavior of labor 
productivity (as reported by GNP/hours in Table 1) be 
interpreted with caution. 
Since the human-capital-weighted cyclical measure 
of labor input fluctuates less than does aggregate hours, 
the implicit real wage (the ratio of total real labor 
compensation to labor input) is even more procyclical 
than average hourly real compensation. (For the latter 
series, see Table 1.) This finding that the real wage 
behaves in a reasonably strong procyclical manner is 
Table 4 
Cyclical Behavior of U.S. Monetary Aggregates and the Price Level 
Deviations From Trend of Money Stock, Velocity, and Price Level 
Quarterly, 1954-1989 
Cross Correlation of Real GNP With 
Volatility 
Variable x (% Std. Dev.) x(t- 5) x(t-A) x(t- 3) x(t- 2) x(M) x(t) x(M) x(t+2) x(/+3) x(/+4) x(/+5) 
Nominal Money Stock* 
Monetary Base  0.88  -0.12  0.02  0.14  0.25  0.36  0.41  0.40  0.37  0.32  0.28  0.26 
M1  1.68  0.01  0.12  0.23  0.33  0.35  0.31  0.22  0.15  0.09  0.07  0.07 
M2  1.51  0.48  0.60  0.67  0.68  0.61  0.46  0.26  0.05  -0.15  -0.33  -0.46 
M2-M1  1.91  0.53  0.63  0.67  0.65  0.56  0.40  0.20  -0.01  -0.21  -0.39  -0.53 
ocity* 
Monetary Base  1.33  -0.26  -0.15  0.00  0.22  0.40  0.59  0.50  0.37  0.22  0.08  -0.08 
M1  2.02  -0.24  -0.19  -0.12  -0.01  0.14  0.31  0.32  0.27  0.20  0.10  0.00 
M2  1.84  -0.63  -0.59  -0.48  -0.29  -0.05  0.24  0.34  0.40  0.43  0.44  0.43 
:e Level 
Implicit GNP Deflator  0.89  -0.50  -0.61  -0.68  -0.69  -0.64  -0.55  -0.43  -0.31  -0.17  -0.04  0.09 
Consumer Price Index  1.41  -0.52  -0.63  -0.70  -0.72  -0.68  -0.57  -0.41  -0.24  -0.05  0.14  0.30 
* Based on quarterly data, 1959:1-1989:4. 
Source of basic data: Citicorp's Citibase data bank 
13 counter to a widely held belief in the literature. [For a 
fairly recent expression of this belief, see the article by 
Lawrence Summers (1986, p. 25), which states that 
there is "no apparent procyclicality of real wages."] 
• Output Components 
Real GNP is displayed in Chart 4, along with its three 
major components: consumption, investment, and gov-
ernment purchases. These three components do not 
quite add up to real GNP, the difference being ac-
counted for by net exports and change in business 
inventories. Because household investment in consumer 
durables behaves similarly to fixed investment in the 
business sector, we have added those two series. By far 
the largest component (nearly two-thirds) of total 
output is consumption of nondurable goods and serv-
ices. This component, moreover, has relatively little 
volatility. The chart shows that the bulk of the volatility 
in aggregate output is due to investment expenditures. 
The cyclical components (relative to cyclical real 
GNP) of consumer nondurables and services, consumer 
durable investment, fixed investment, and government 
purchases are reported in Table 2 and plotted in Charts 
5-8. From the table and charts, we can see that all but 
government purchases are highly procyclical. House-
hold and business investment in durables have similar 
Chart 4 
U.S. Real Gross National Product and Its Components* 
Quarterly, 1954-1989 
Tril. of 
"Consumption includes nondurable goods and services. Investment is the sum of 
consumer durable investment and business fixed investment. Components do not 
add to total because net exports and the change in business inventories are 
excluded. 
Source of basic data: Citicorp's Citibase data bank 
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amplitudes of percentage fluctuations. Expenditures for 
consumer durables leads slightly while nonresidential 
fixed investment lags the cycle, especially investment in 
structures. Consumer nondurables and services is a 
relatively smooth series. 
Some of the interesting features of the other compo-
nents are that government purchases has no consistent 
pro- or countercyclical pattern, that imports is procycli-
cal with no phase shift, and that exports is procyclical 
but lags the cycle by from six months to a year. 
The cyclical behavior of the major output compo-
nents, measured as shares of real GNP, is reported in 
Table 3. Using fractions rather than the logarithms of 
the series permits us to include some series that could 
not be used in Table 2 because they are negative during 
some quarters. We see that the change in business 
inventories is procyclical. Net exports is a counter-
cyclical variable, with the association being strongest 
for exports shifted back by about a year. 
• Factor Incomes 
Tables 2 and 3 also provide information about factor 
incomes, which are the components of national income. 
The cyclical behavior of factor incomes is described in 
terms of their levels (Table 2) and their shares of GNP 
(Table 3). Since proprietors' income includes labor and 
capital income, we treat this component (plus some 
small miscellaneous components) separately. We find 
that proprietors' income, as a share of national income, 
is uncorrected with the cycle. 
Table 2 shows that both labor income and capital 
income are strongly procyclical and that capital income 
is highly volatile. Table 3 shows that, measured as 
shares of total income, labor income is countercyclical 
while capital income is procyclical. 
Nominal Facts 
The statistical properties of the cyclical components of 
various nominal aggregates are summarized in Table 4, 
and four of these series along with cyclical real GNP are 
plotted on Charts 9-12. 
• Monetary Aggregates 
There is no evidence that either the monetary base or 
Ml leads the cycle, although some economists still 
believe this monetary myth. Both the monetary base 
and M1 series are generally procyclical and, if anything, 
the monetary base lags the cycle slightly. 
An exception to this rule occurred during the 
expansion of the 1980s. This expansion, so long and 
steady, has even led some economists and journalists to Finn E. Kydland, Edward C. Prescott 
Business Cycles 
Charts 5-8 
Deviations From Trend of U.S. Real Gross National Product 
and Its Components 
Quarterly, 1954-1989 
Chart 5 Consumption of Nondurable Goods & Services 
Chart 7 Business Fixed Investment 
% 
Source of basic data: Citicorp's Citibase data bank 
Chart 6 Consumer Durable Investment 
% 
Chart 8 Government Purchases 
% 
15 Charts 9-12 
Deviations From Trend of U.S. Real Gross National Product 
and Selected Nominal Aggregates 
Quarterly, 1959-1989* 
Tor the price level, 1954-1989. 
Source of basic data: Citicorp's Citibase data bank 
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speculate that the business cycle is dead (Zarnowitz 
1989 and The Economist 1989). During the expansion, 
Ml was uncommonly volatile, and M2, the more com-
prehensive measure of the money stock, showed some 
evidence that it leads the cycle by a couple quarters. 
The difference in the behavior of Ml and M2 
suggests that the difference of these aggregates (M2 
minus M1) should be considered. This component main-
ly consists of interest-bearing time deposits, including 
certificates of deposit under $100,000. It is approxi-
mately one-half of annual GNP, whereas Ml is about 
one-sixth. The difference of M2 - M1 leads the cycle by 
even more than M2, with the lead being about three 
quarters. 
From Table 4 it is also apparent that money veloc-
ities are procyclical and quite volatile. 
• Price Level 
Earlier in this paper, we documented the view that the 
price level is always procyclical. This myth originated 
from the fact that, during the period between the world 
wars, the price level was procyclical. But because of the 
Koopmans taboo against reporting business cycle facts, 
no one bothered to ascertain the cyclical behavior of the 
price level since World War II. Instead, economists just 
carried on, trying to develop business cycle theories in 
which the price level plays a central role and behaves 
procyclically. The fact is, however, that whether mea-
sured by the implicit GNP deflator or by the consumer 
price index, the U.S. price level clearly has been 
countercyclical in the post-Korean War period. 
Concluding Remarks 
Let us reemphasize that, unlike Burns and Mitchell, we 
are not claiming to measure business cycles. We also 
think it inadvisable to start our economics from some 
statistical definition of trend and deviation from trend, 
with growth theory being concerned with trend and 
business cycle theory with deviations. Growth theory 
deals with both trend and deviations. 
The statistics we report are of interest, given neo-
classical growth theory, because they are—or maybe 
were—in apparent conflict with that theory. Document-
ing real or apparent systematic deviations from theory 
is a legitimate activity in the natural sciences and 
should be so in economics as well. 
We hope that the facts reported here will help guide 
the selection of model economies to study. We caution 
that any theory in which procyclical prices figure 
crucially in accounting for postwar business cycle 
fluctuations is doomed to failure. The facts we report 
indicate that the price level since the Korean War 
moves countercyclical^. 
The fact that the transaction component of real cash 
balances (Ml) moves contemporaneously with the 
cycle while the much larger nontransaction component 
(M2) leads the cycle suggests that credit arrangements 
could play a significant role in future business cycle 
theory. Introducing money and credit into growth 
theory in a way that accounts for the cyclical behavior 
of monetary as well as real aggregates is an important 
open problem in economics. 
6 Two interesting attempts to introduce money into growth theory are the 
work of Cooley and Hansen (1989) and Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and D. Lucas 
(1988). Their approach focuses on the transaction role of money. 
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